Sažetak | Dostupnost plina na europskom tržištu, niska cijena i čistoća plina kao energenta utjecalo je na
sve veće korištenje u industriji zemalja Europe krajem 20. stoljeća. Plinski cjevovodi od Rusije
prema Europi intenzivno su se gradili i produživali. Iako Rusija nije jedini proizvođač plina u
Europi ona je zbog dobrih odnosa s vladam članica zemlja EU i cijenom plina zauzela mjesto
glavnog dobavljača. Rastom potreba za plinom početkom 21. stoljeća rasla je i ovisnost članica
EU o ruskom plinu. Teroristički napadi u svijetu na gospodarske objekte, prometnu i energetsku
infrastrukturu utjecali su na promjenu sadržaja koncepta nacionalne sigurnosti početkom 21.
stoljeću. Energetska sigurnost postaje dijelom koncepta nacionalne sigurnost i uglavnom je
definirana kroz zadovoljenje potreba kupaca na nacionalnom tržištu. Nakon ruske aneksije
Krima i uvođenja sankcija EU Rusiji sadržaj koncepta energetske sigurnosti u potpunosti se
mijenja, jer je plin postao instrument vanjske politike kojeg je Rusija počela koristiti za
ostvarenje svojih političkih ciljeva. EU donosi novo zakonodavstvo kojem postavlja zahtjeve
pred zemlje članice da procjene rizike koji ugrožavaju sigurnost plinske mreže i rad operatera
plinske kopnene mreže.
Cilj: Istražiti aspekte i procjenu sigurnosti plinske mreže u EU, vrste, prirodu i ozbiljnost rizika
u opskrbi, transportu i poslovanju operatora plinske kopnene mreže, zatim prikazati izradu
plana sigurnosne zaštite operatera kopnene plinske mreže i mjera kojima će procijenjeni rizici
biti izbjegavani, transferirani ili reducirani.
Metoda: Za utvrđivanje rizika plinske mreže u EU korištena je metoda analize i sinteze.
Metodom analize izdvojeni aspekti rizika raščlanjeni su na elemente kako bi se utvrdilo kako
utječu na sigurnost plinske mreže. Dobivene spoznaje metodom sinteze spojene su na novi
način i njihovo spajanje omogućilo je novi pogled na sigurnost i rizike. Metoda dedukcije
omogućila je posredno logičko zaključivanje o utvrđenim rizicima odnosno izvlačenje
specifičnih zaključaka o načinu djelovanja na utvrđene rizike odnosno kako ih izbjeći,
transferirati ili reducirati i osigurati sigurnost opskrbe plinom.
Rezultat: Istraživanje je pokazalo da najveći rizici u opskrbi plinom proizlaze od jednog
dobavljača, zaposlenika operatera i cyber prijetnji. Utvrđene rizike provođenjem mjera koje su
postavljene u planu sigurnosne zaštite operatora može se izbjeći, transferirati i reducirati na
prihvatljivu razinu. Rizik od jednog dobavljača može se izbjeći diverzifikacijom opskrbe, a
rizik od zaposlenika i cyber prijatni može se izbjeći i reducirati obukom i uvođenjem
učinkovitijih sigurnosnih protokola i kontrola.
Zaključak: Procjena rizika koji ugrožavaju sigurnost plinske mreže i rad operatera plinske
kopnene mreže omogućila je identificiranje rizika, izradu plana sigurnosti i akcijskog plana i
podizanje razine sigurnosti opskrbe plinom na višu razinu za slučaj iznenadnog prekida
isporuke plina iz Rusije. Iznenadni prekid opskrbe bez izrade novog plana sigurnosti i akcijskog
plana stvorio bi negativne učinke na gospodarstvo EU, poslovanje operatora, opskrbu
kućanstava i kvalitetu života svih građana. |
Sažetak (engleski) | The availability of gas on the European market, the low price and purity of gas as an energy
source influenced its increasing use in the industry of European countries at the end of the 20th
century. Gas pipelines from Russia to Europe were intensively built and extended. Although
Russia is not the only gas producer in Europe, due to good relations with European Unions
Member States and the price of gas, it has taken the place of the main supplier. With the
increased demand of gas at the beginning of the 21st century, the dependence of EU Member
States on Russian gas increased. Terrorist attacks in the world on economic facilities, transport
and energy infrastructure had impact on the change in the content of the concept of national
security at the beginning of the 21st century. Energy security becomes part of the concept of
national security and is mainly defined by meeting the needs of customers on the national
market. After the Russian annexation of Crimea and the introduction of EU sanctions against
Russia, the content of the concept of energy security is completely changing, because gas has
become an instrument of foreign policy that Russia has begun to use to achieve its political
goals. The European Union is passing new legislation that requires Member States to assess the
risks that threaten the safety of the gas network and the work of operators of the onshore gas
network.
The aim: Investigation of the aspects and assessment of the security of the gas network in the
European Union, the types, nature, and severity of the risks in supply, transport and operations
of the onshore gas network operator, subsequently to present the preparation of the security
protection plan of the onshore gas network operators and the measures by which the estimated
risks will be avoided, transferred or reduced.
The method: To determine the risk of the gas network in the European Union, the method of
analysis and synthesis was used. The risk aspects identified by the analysis method are broken
down into elements to determine how they affect the safety of the gas network. The knowledge
gained through the synthesis method was combined in a new way and their combination enabled
a new view of security and risks. The deduction method made it possible to make indirect
logical conclusion about the identified risks, that is, to draw specific conclusions about how to
act on the identified risks, or how to avoid, transfer or reduce them and ensure the security of
the gas supply.
The result: The research has shown that the biggest risks in gas supply come from single
supplier, operator employees and cyber threats. Identified risks can be avoided, transferred and
reduced to an acceptable level by implementing the set measures in the operator’s safety
protection plan.
Single supplier risk can be avoided by diversifying supply, and employee and cyber risks can
be avoided and reduced by training and implementing more effective security protocols and
controls.
The conclusion: The assessment of risks that threaten the safety of the gas network and the
work of the onshore gas network operator enabled the identification of risk, drawing up a
security plan and an action plan, and raising the level of security of gas supply to a higher level
in case of a sudden interruption of gas supply from Russia. A sudden interruption of supply
without creating a new security plan and action plan would create negative effects on the EU
economy, operators’ business, the supply of households and the quality of life of all citizens. |